Should Basic Underwriting Rules be Applied to Average Crop Revenue Election and Supplemental Revenue?

This paper considers methods to adversely select on Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) and Supplemental Revenue (SURE). In the case of winter wheat, farmers had a large amount of a priori yield and price information before electing 2009 ACRE. Prior to the August 14 sign-up for ACRE, wheat was 3 months into the marketing year. In most years nearly half of the national average price is determined in the first 3 months of the marketing year. With this available information it was clear that Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington wheat would collect the maximum or near the maximum ACRE payment, while there was little chance that ACRE would pay on Colorado wheat.Adverse Selection, Average Crop Revenue Election, Crop Insurance, Supplemental Revenue, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance, Crop Production/Industries, Farm Management, Political Economy, Risk and Uncertainty, Q18,

THE FARMER'S GRAIN MARKETING GUIDE

Crop Production/Industries, Marketing,

Mathematical Formulas for Calculating Net Returns from Participation in Government Farm Programs: Provisions of the Food, Agricultural, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990

Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance,

Reduction of Yield and Income Risk Under Alternative Crop Insurance and Disaster Assistance Plans

This study compares the effectiveness of five crop insurance/disaster assistance plans: an individual farm yield insurance plan similar to the current FCIC multi-peril program ; two area yield insurance plans; a farm yield disaster assistance plan; and an area yield disaster assistance plan. These methods are examined for reduction in yield and gross income variability with and without participation in the government deficiency payment programs using farm-level yield data from 98 dryland wheat farms and 38 dryland corn farms in Kansas . Although individual farm yield insurance is complex, suffers from moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and is likely to be the most expensive to administer , it provides more yield and gross income risk reduction than any of the alternative insurance/disaster assistance plans.Crop Insurance, Crop Disaster Assistance, Risk, Wheat, Corn, Risk and Uncertainty,

MATHEMATICAL FORMULAS FOR CALCULATING NET RETURNS FROM PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, CRP, AND CROP INSURANCE ALTERNATIVES

The purpose of this report is to provide a revised version of the publication, "Mathematical Formulas for Calculating Net Returns from Participation in Government Commodity Programs including Marketing Loans" (Williams and Barnaby, 1994). The change in design of the government commodity programs and development of several crop insurance alternatives has been significant since the previous paper was published. The formulas for calculating net returns incorporate provisions from the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 and several crop insurance designs developed in the 1990s. Individuals conducting research or education programs will be able to use this revision for reference when estimating net returns for producers under current commodity program and crop insurance plan provisions.Agricultural Finance,

SHOULD ANY AD HOC DISASTER AID BE TARGETED TO THE "HOLE" IN THE FARM SAFETY NET?

Speech and PowerPoint Presentatio

Should Basic Underwriting Rules be Applied to Average Crop Revenue Election and Supplemental Revenue?

This paper considers methods to adversely select on Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) and Supplemental Revenue (SURE). In the case of winter wheat, farmers had a large amount of a priori yield and price information before electing 2009 ACRE. Prior to the August 14 sign-up for ACRE, wheat was 3 months into the marketing year. In most years nearly half of the national average price is determined in the first 3 months of the marketing year. With this available information it was clear that Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington wheat would collect the maximum or near the maximum ACRE payment, while there was little chance that ACRE would pay on Colorado wheat

SHOULD ANY AD HOC DISASTER AID BE TARGETED TO THE "HOLE" IN THE FARM SAFETY NET?

Agricultural and Food Policy,

PUBLIC POLICY FOR CATASTROPIDC YIELD RISK: An Alternative Crop Insurance Program

U.S. farmers have for years relied on the financial support of both federally funded crop insurance and direct disaster assistance. Limits on availability of federal funds dictate that programs less costly to the government than disaster programs but more effective than past crop insurance programs be devised. An insurance program that pays according to losses in areas such as a county is one alternative. With such a plan farmers would pay less for protection. Its administrative cost would be less than typical crop insurance programs. Quality county yield data would be required